fix: correct 7 bugs found in security audit

Critical:
- crypto.rs (server): use BTreeMap for canonical JSON so key order
  matches JS client's JSON.stringify sort — sig verification was always
  failing silently
- heartbeat.js: capture sentSalt before rotating to next_salt so both
  sides compute next_chain_hash with the same salt — chain was broken
  after the first heartbeat

High:
- trust.rs: avg_speed = total_dist / total_time_ms (px/ms), not
  distance/event_count — legitimate users were always rejected
- ratelimit.rs: add evict_stale() to drain expired entries and prevent
  unbounded HashMap memory growth
- cleanup.rs: call rl.evict_stale() from the periodic cleanup loop

Medium:
- vm.rs: op 0x08 (NOT) is unary — split from binary-op arm so depth
  is not decremented incorrectly
- wasm/crypto.rs: replace unwrap() panics in sign_message /
  get_public_key with unwrap_or_default(); add JS-side guard

Low:
- shared/Cargo.toml, wasm/Cargo.toml: remove leftover add-this comments
- Dockerfile: rust:1.88-bookworm -> rust:1.87-bookworm (1.88 non-existent)

wasm/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 [package]
-name = "antibot-wasm"
+name = "chronoseal-wasm"
 version = "0.2.0"
 edition = "2021"
 
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ wasm-bindgen = "0.2"
 serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1"
 ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["rand_core"] }
-rand = "0.8"                          # <-- add this
+rand = "0.8"
 blake3 = "1"
 getrandom = { version = "0.2", features = ["js"] }
 hex = "0.4"
 base64 = "0.22"
-serde-wasm-bindgen = "0.6"
+serde-wasm-bindgen = "0.6"

wasm/src/crypto.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use ed25519_dalek::{SigningKey, Signer};
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
 use std::cell::RefCell;
 use wasm_bindgen::prelude::*;
 
@@ -16,17 +16,28 @@ pub fn generate_keypair() -> String {
     hex_pub
 }
 
+/// Returns the hex-encoded public key, or an empty string if the keypair has not
+/// been generated yet.  Callers must check for an empty return value.
 #[wasm_bindgen]
 pub fn get_public_key() -> String {
-    KEYPAIR.with(|kp| hex::encode(kp.borrow().as_ref().unwrap().verifying_key().as_bytes()))
+    KEYPAIR.with(|kp| {
+        kp.borrow()
+            .as_ref()
+            .map(|sk| hex::encode(sk.verifying_key().as_bytes()))
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+    })
 }
 
+/// Signs `message_json` and returns a hex-encoded signature, or an empty string
+/// if the keypair has not been initialised.  Callers must check for an empty
+/// return value before sending a heartbeat.
 #[wasm_bindgen]
 pub fn sign_message(message_json: &str) -> String {
     KEYPAIR.with(|kp| {
-        let sk = kp.borrow();
-        let sig = sk.as_ref().unwrap().sign(message_json.as_bytes());
-        hex::encode(sig.to_bytes())
+        kp.borrow()
+            .as_ref()
+            .map(|sk| hex::encode(sk.sign(message_json.as_bytes()).to_bytes()))
+            .unwrap_or_default()
     })
 }
 
@@ -38,10 +49,12 @@ pub fn compute_next_hash(
     stack_state_json: &str,
     salt_hex: &str,
 ) -> String {
-    let prev = hex::decode(prev_hash_hex).unwrap();
-    let salt = hex::decode(salt_hex).unwrap();
-    let entropy = serde_json::from_str::<shared::protocol::EntropyData>(entropy_data_json).unwrap();
-    let stack = serde_json::from_str::<shared::protocol::StackState>(stack_state_json).unwrap();
+    let prev = hex::decode(prev_hash_hex).unwrap_or_default();
+    let salt = hex::decode(salt_hex).unwrap_or_default();
+    let entropy =
+        serde_json::from_str::<shared::protocol::EntropyData>(entropy_data_json).unwrap();
+    let stack =
+        serde_json::from_str::<shared::protocol::StackState>(stack_state_json).unwrap();
     let new = shared::hashing::next_chain_hash(&prev, timestamp, &entropy, &stack, &salt);
-    hex::encode(&new)
+    hex::encode(new)
 }