6 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
thakares	8d119ac00e	Harden validation, improve runtime security and refactor core services	2026-06-04 19:58:21 +05:30
thakares	3225509713	Begin post-v1.0.1 protocol and runtime improvements	2026-05-30 21:00:22 +05:30
thakares	ba768da58e	feat: implement v0.6.0 mutation engine and db_type runtime selection	2026-05-29 14:50:45 +05:30
thakares	9e78daeeba	Refactor ChronoSeal daemon for dynamic configurations, connection pooling, custom error handling, and complete tests (v0.5.0)	2026-05-22 18:56:28 +05:30
thakares	b75d586b86	fix: correct 7 bugs found in security audit ... Critical: - crypto.rs (server): use BTreeMap for canonical JSON so key order matches JS client's JSON.stringify sort — sig verification was always failing silently - heartbeat.js: capture sentSalt before rotating to next_salt so both sides compute next_chain_hash with the same salt — chain was broken after the first heartbeat High: - trust.rs: avg_speed = total_dist / total_time_ms (px/ms), not distance/event_count — legitimate users were always rejected - ratelimit.rs: add evict_stale() to drain expired entries and prevent unbounded HashMap memory growth - cleanup.rs: call rl.evict_stale() from the periodic cleanup loop Medium: - vm.rs: op 0x08 (NOT) is unary — split from binary-op arm so depth is not decremented incorrectly - wasm/crypto.rs: replace unwrap() panics in sign_message / get_public_key with unwrap_or_default(); add JS-side guard Low: - shared/Cargo.toml, wasm/Cargo.toml: remove leftover add-this comments - Dockerfile: rust:1.88-bookworm -> rust:1.87-bookworm (1.88 non-existent)	2026-05-08 14:27:41 +05:30
thakares	a66debdece	Initial ChronoSeal release	2026-05-07 21:57:47 +05:30