Critical: - crypto.rs (server): use BTreeMap for canonical JSON so key order matches JS client's JSON.stringify sort — sig verification was always failing silently - heartbeat.js: capture sentSalt before rotating to next_salt so both sides compute next_chain_hash with the same salt — chain was broken after the first heartbeat High: - trust.rs: avg_speed = total_dist / total_time_ms (px/ms), not distance/event_count — legitimate users were always rejected - ratelimit.rs: add evict_stale() to drain expired entries and prevent unbounded HashMap memory growth - cleanup.rs: call rl.evict_stale() from the periodic cleanup loop Medium: - vm.rs: op 0x08 (NOT) is unary — split from binary-op arm so depth is not decremented incorrectly - wasm/crypto.rs: replace unwrap() panics in sign_message / get_public_key with unwrap_or_default(); add JS-side guard Low: - shared/Cargo.toml, wasm/Cargo.toml: remove leftover add-this comments - Dockerfile: rust:1.88-bookworm -> rust:1.87-bookworm (1.88 non-existent)
60 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust
60 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
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use std::cell::RefCell;
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use wasm_bindgen::prelude::*;
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thread_local! {
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static KEYPAIR: RefCell<Option<SigningKey>> = RefCell::new(None);
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}
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn generate_keypair() -> String {
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let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
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let sk = SigningKey::generate(&mut rng);
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let pk = sk.verifying_key();
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let hex_pub = hex::encode(pk.as_bytes());
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KEYPAIR.with(|kp| *kp.borrow_mut() = Some(sk));
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hex_pub
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}
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/// Returns the hex-encoded public key, or an empty string if the keypair has not
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/// been generated yet. Callers must check for an empty return value.
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn get_public_key() -> String {
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KEYPAIR.with(|kp| {
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kp.borrow()
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.as_ref()
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.map(|sk| hex::encode(sk.verifying_key().as_bytes()))
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.unwrap_or_default()
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})
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}
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/// Signs `message_json` and returns a hex-encoded signature, or an empty string
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/// if the keypair has not been initialised. Callers must check for an empty
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/// return value before sending a heartbeat.
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn sign_message(message_json: &str) -> String {
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KEYPAIR.with(|kp| {
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kp.borrow()
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.as_ref()
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.map(|sk| hex::encode(sk.sign(message_json.as_bytes()).to_bytes()))
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.unwrap_or_default()
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})
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}
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#[wasm_bindgen]
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pub fn compute_next_hash(
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prev_hash_hex: &str,
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timestamp: u64,
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entropy_data_json: &str,
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stack_state_json: &str,
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salt_hex: &str,
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) -> String {
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let prev = hex::decode(prev_hash_hex).unwrap_or_default();
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let salt = hex::decode(salt_hex).unwrap_or_default();
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let entropy =
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serde_json::from_str::<shared::protocol::EntropyData>(entropy_data_json).unwrap();
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let stack =
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serde_json::from_str::<shared::protocol::StackState>(stack_state_json).unwrap();
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let new = shared::hashing::next_chain_hash(&prev, timestamp, &entropy, &stack, &salt);
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hex::encode(new)
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} |